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Problem and objectives 
This paper focuses on the transformation of political institutions in democracies, in which 
mass media are assigned to have great impact on social structures. The process of exerting 
influence by mass media on nearly every social sphere, which is described as 
"mediatization", takes the centre stage of this paper4. Mediatization in this context means the 
implementation of mass media logic within political processes (cp. Marcinkowski, 2005). The 
term media logic refers to patterns of producing and steering attention, such as 
personalization, negativity, conflict orientation. It is assumed that this development leads to a 
depolitization of anciently political matters (cp. Kaase, 1998; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Schulz, 2004). Depolitization expresses itself in a specific self-dramatization and external 
dramatization of political institutions, whereas media logic becomes the central parameter for 
every form of public presentation. This becomes manifest both in a specific form of 
presentation in media coverage, what results in a simplifying description because of media 
routines, and in modes of adaptation in political institutions themselves, which are concerned 
with their continuous self-dramatization. 
In general, the term "mediatization" in contemporary mass communication research is linked 
with a wide range of partially clouded, inexplicit, and highly normative presumptions, and 
implies deep impacts on entire societies or political systems. One of the most prevalent 
assumptions linked to this context is the assumption of media democracy or even 
"mediocracy" as a result of mediatization of politics. The discussion about "media 
democracy" is by no means a new one and resumes a prior debate on modern publicity 
process, which focuses on the corroding impact of old and new media on political institutions 
and behaviours in a set of political contexts (Mazzoleni, 1998: 103 referring to Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995). Existing research often assume, that media democracy and the increasing 
impact of media on public affairs must be convicted. Mostly, media are seen as a 
perturbance of the political process and a hindrance for political decision making. It is a 
commonly shared perception that mass media dominates, even colonizes, the political 
system, and along with it its central players - political institutions. They undergo an 
adaptation process, which turns them into followers of media logic instead of institutional 
logic. Therefore most scholars think of mediatization only from the perspective that media 
dominate – or even worse: determine - politics. In sum: Media influence in this perspective is 
seen as a dysfunctional influence on the political process and its institutions, which 
endangers democracy as such. In opposition to this point of view, we assume that effects of 
mediatization could be both dysfunctional and functional. It depends fundamentally on the 
characteristics of the institutions which get mediatized. 
Empirical findings of media impact on political structures exist up to now rather in research 
studies of media impact on parties or parliaments (cp. Marschall, 2001; Mughan, 2000) and – 
first of all - on election campaigns. Existing empirical studies often concentrate on election 
campaigns ending with the conclusion, that election campaigns are increasingly mediatized. 
But – this conclusion is no sufficient proof for the concept of mediatization (Marcinkowski, 
2005: 344). Whatever else if not election campaigns should be mediatized? Election 
                                                 
4 Therefore we use the term mediatization in a restricted meaning and explicitly for the evasive influence of 
traditional mass media such as newspapers, magazines, TV, or radio. Most of our assumptions can be applied 
also for the World Wide Web, but this needs special examination, so that we focus on the traditional mass media.  
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campaigns depend fundamentally on their publicity. If mass media are the most important 
channel to reach the public in modern democracies, it is quite obvious that especially election 
campaigns would be highly influenced by mass media. Verification of the mediatization 
concept needs stronger and more evidences - also in a comparative perspective.  
For this reason, in this paper we look at the role of institutional structures and ask for their 
moderating effects regarding the probability for changes in political structures by 
mediatization. Empirical studies so far neglect the question, what aspects moderate 
mediatization effects. Further, empirical evidences lack on studies about mediatization of 
other political institutions than elections, parties or parliaments. Also, there is a strong need 
for more comparative research. The paper tries to fill in the blanks and focuses on the 
investigation of moderating variables of mediatization effects with respect to characteristics 
of political institutions. We focus on political negotiating institutions, assuming that this is a 
"hard" test for both the transferability of the theorem of mediatization on other objects of 
investigation as well as its expressiveness for the explanation of societal changes.. The 
paper presents parts of a comprehensive research project5 that analyzes both preconditions 
of mediatization (with respect to characteristics of political institutions and characteristics of 
media systems), as well as resulting mediatization effects on the rules and functionality of 
institutions regarding negotiating institutions. 
Against the background of the concept of mediatization this paper discusses actual 
observations of the likeliness of mediatization effects on examples from the US, Switzerland, 
Germany and the Vatican. Aim of this paper is to reveal the relevance of the specific 
institutional order. We argue that institutional structures moderate mediatization effects. 
 
Media and political institutions 
There are doubts on the idea of the utterly determination of media logics in political 
institutions. More convincing from this perspective is the idea of a co-existence of various 
logics that might function as orientation system for politics (Marcinkowski, 2005: 346). 
Whether this additional media logic is the cause for mediatization effects of political 
institutions and to what extend that might be the case depends on two aspects mainly. First, 
the type of political institution and second the relation between their logic and media logic 
(Marcinkowski, 2005: 346 et seq.). Thus mediatization effects may vary from one political 
institution to another. Before we can analyze mediatization processes of politics we thus 
have to: 
• differentiate political institutions firstly, 
• examine their specific logics in relation to media logics secondly and 
                                                 
5 The Project “The dynamics of political institutions in mediated democracies: Political bargaining and the 
transformation of the public sphere” is led by Frank Marcinkowski and part of the “National Centre of Competence 
in Research: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century”, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(For details refer to: http://www.nccr-democracy.unizh.ch). 
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• analyze the likeliness of mediatization effects for the objects of investigation thirdly. 
 
Differentiation of political institutions 
Whereas traditional institutional theory in political science and historical-descriptive studies of 
governmental systems tended to devote their attention to describing formal institutions, 
especially constitutional arrangements, today this type of descriptive analysis is generally 
considered inadequate (March & Olsen, 1984; Olson, 1991; Czada, 1995). Formal policy-
making is supplemented in important ways through informal governance in institutionalized 
contexts in which a multiplicity of public and private actors interact (Windhoff-Héritier, 1980; 
Scharpf, 2000). Those changes in the structure of political rulings are concomitant 
phenomena of structural changes in modern societies in general (Mayntz, 1993: 41). 
This increasingly complex system of political regulation has recently been labelled 
“governance” (Kooiman, 2003; Benz 2004). In order to capture this complexity, we need a 
concept of institutions that draws on the “new state architecture” (Grande, 1993) and 
recognizes the relative autonomy of institutional arrangements without simplifying their 
influence on political outcomes as determinative. The most promising alternative is March 
and Olsen’s (1987; 1989) new institutionalism, which Czada (1995: 211) credits with having 
“‘rediscovered’ the logic of institutionally structured behavior […] and recognizing the 
significance of institutional arrangements, in particular in the way they constitute political 
actors by allocating functions, status, resources, and orientations.” This new preoccupation 
with institutions has also highlighted the way that institutions shape ordering principles and 
thus perceptions and rationalities, including willingness to accept the authority of political 
institutions (Rehberg, 1995). 
We draw on the “new institutionalist” definition of political institutions. In that sense 
institutions are conceived as relatively permanent systems of rules that organize the 
framework of behavior for individual and collective actors and determine the range of actions 
available to those actors. Complex democratic systems are characterized by the coexistence 
of numerous such systems of rules, each organized by a distinct logic. These rule systems 
qualify as political to the extent that they serve the production and distribution of public goods 
(Czada, 1995: 205). 
Following this definition, a variety of different political institutions can be distinguished. 
Recent research focuses on the consensus model of democracy after a long period of 
claiming the Westminster Model of majoritarian democracy as ideal conception. Lijphart, who 
elaborated this concept using the Dutch case, was able to demonstrate up to the mid-1980s 
that this method of resolving political conflicts is manifested much more widely among West 
European democracies than commonly believed (Lijphart, 1977; 1984). Lehmbruch’s 
foundational study (“Party Competition in the Federal State”, 2000, initially 1976) was the first 
to point out competitive and negotiated democratic elements in the (West) German political 
system. Together with the literature on corporatism, which highlighted the significance of 
neo-corporatist bargaining processes (Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982), as well as 
observations of the bargaining patterns of administrative agencies (Benz 1998), consensus 
democracy research eventually produced the concepts of negotiation democracy and of 
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institutionalized negotiating systems (Mayntz, 1993). This term refers to rule systems that 
have partially withdrawn controversial policy issues out of the realm of party competition and 
majority rule, in favor of arrangements that favor amicable settlements among leading 
political actors (Grande, 2004). 
 
Logics of negotiating institutions in relation to media logics 
Following Benz, modern democracies have to deal with deficits concerning the efficacy of 
problem solving. Negotiating systems are required to ensure efficacy of those processes 
(Benz, 1998: 204). Due to the obviously huge relevance of negotiating systems in 21st 
century democracies, our paper focuses on the possibilities and limits of mediatization 
effects in negotiating institutions. These are dependent not only on the type of political 
institutions - negotiating systems in that case - but on the relation between their logic and 
media logic also (Marcinkowski, 2005: 346et seq.). This is what we will focus at in the 
following paragraph. 
The internal logic of bargaining institutions is not determined purely by interests and 
resources, but also by specific features of the mode of communication. Key characteristics of 
bargaining have been described by Jon Elster (1989: 50 et seq.; 1991; 1995), who defines 
bargaining as a decision-oriented form of communication that aims to achieve a compromise 
between divergent interests. Bargaining actors represent specific interests and strategically 
employ threats, warnings, and promises during the negotiation process, which should be 
backed up by material capacities and resources. The participants’ bargaining position 
depends on the credibility of their threats and promises, which can be reinforced or 
undermined by media communication. Successful negotiations result in the partial 
consideration of all participating interests in the form of an amicable compromise. Political 
bargains are generally highly specialized, involve a limited number of actors, and are subject 
to strict time constraints. Elster and others have pointed out that a decisive prerequisite of 
successful negotiation is the exclusion of the public from the bargaining process (Lehmbruch, 
2000: 26). This atmosphere of privacy provides participants with the opportunity to 
demonstrate willingness to compromise without losing their credibility as loyal 
representatives of their respective interests. Threats and promises are more credible in this 
context, since they can’t be relativized in public or be denied when they don’t become public 
in the first place. Positions and arguments can be flexibly deployed and withdrawn when 
actors don’t have to worry about losing face in public. Negotiated agreements require careful 
re-phrasing once they are made public, with successes characterized as a collective 
achievement and individual contributions suppressed. Finally, a successful negotiation is 
only possible when each participant can walk away with something to display to his clientele 
and to the public at large as evidence that he “won” the negotiation. Both are only possible 
when the intimacy of negotiations can be preserved. Under the conditions of media driven 
democracy and media logic, these prerequisites of negotiated democratic decision-making 
are increasingly difficult to realize.  
The term media logic refers to regular media patterns of producing and steering attention. 
The mass media claim the right to total transparency and publicity of political processes and 
tend to be provoked when confronted with closed doors. Furthermore, the media’s tendency 
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to personalize the political process leads to an emphasis on conflict and failure, and 
policymaking becomes framed as a contest with a winner and a loser (Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1995; Negrine, 1996; Brants & Sinue, 1998, Hallin & Mancini, 2003). Table 1 contrasts the 
logic of negotiations and media logic (Marcinkowski, 2005: 352). 
 
 
 
Logic of negotiations Media Logic 
Privacy Transparency, Publicity 
Compromises Conflicts 
Collective decisions Interest in specific persons 
Interest in winner Interest in loser 
Table 1: logic of negotiations in contrast to media logic 
 
In order to attract the media’s attention, political actors have to adapt to this personalized, 
conflict-oriented frame (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), at which point they become unwitting 
accomplices in the hollowing out of the preconditions of negotiation democracy. These 
observations have led several authors (Grande, 2000; 2004; Marcinkowski, 2002; 
Häusermann et al. 2004) to conclude that West European democracies are confronted with a 
new structural contradiction that arises from the combination of negotiated and media 
democracy. They argue that political bargaining and media publicity are based on 
fundamentally incompatible rule systems, to the point that they risk mutual obstruction. 
Grande (2004) illustrated this theory with the contradictory expectations placed on political 
elites and has identified a “strategic trilemma” in German politics, according to which the 
irreconcilable conditions of party competition, the need to negotiate, and the power of the 
new media logic threaten the future of democracy in the media society. The relation between 
the logic of negotiating institutions and media logic is what he considers as the most 
problematic one, since their rule systems are totally incompatible (Grande, 2004). So in 
negotiating systems we find ideal preconditions to analyze possibilities and assumable limits 
of mediatization effects. Since there is a broad variety of negotiating institutions, those 
possibilities and limits might be different depending on the characteristics of the particular 
institution. 
 
Characteristics, structures and procedures of negotiating institutions 
The process of mediatization of political institutions is characterized by the orientation on 
rules of media logic, such as the quest for public attention, the focus on certain actors and 
the differentiation between winners and losers. We argue that possibilities and limits of 
mediatization effects depend on the structures, procedures and other characteristics of 
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political institutions. Hence we now focus on the characteristics and structures of negotiating 
institutions. 
Following Scharpf (2000) and Czada (2000) three types of negotiating institutions can be 
compared regarding the institutional parameters: 
• constitutional coercive forms, 
• institutional stimulated forms, 
• politically demanded forms of cooperation. 
We choose four institutions to exemplary analyze characteristics, structures and procedures 
of negotiating systems. The selected cases shall include all three above mentioned forms of 
negotiating institution. Further, for not only focusing on the comparison of different institutions 
but also integrating a comparative perspective regarding national differences, we choose 
institutions from different nations: Switzerland, Germany and Unites States of America. 
Switzerland represents the consensus democracy, Germany has combinations of 
majoritarian and consensus elements, United States are more of a majoritarian type of 
democracy. Our most exotic case study focuses on the Vatican as the most different case in 
this little overview of different negotiating institutions. We use it as contrast to the other 
cases. 
The Swiss Federal Council (“Bundesrat”) is the executive organ in Switzerland. It is a 
constitutional coercive form. After the elections for the German Bundestag 2005, which didn't 
generate a clear result for forming of government, there have been some exploratory talks 
between the two biggest parties ("exploratory talks"). We consider them as an informal 
negotiating institution, which can be classified as a political demanded form of cooperation. 
Because of the need for negotiating conference committees in the parliament of the US only 
in cases, when the whole chambers fail in their negotiations, we classify U.S. conference 
committees as institutional stimulated. Furthermore we want to look at the Conclave in the 
Vatican as an example of a very low likeliness of media logic implementation in negotiating 
institutions. 
 Switzerland Germany US Vatican 
Institution Federal Council Exploratory 
talks 
Conference 
committees 
Conclave 
Type constitutional 
coercive form 
politically 
demanded form 
of cooperation 
institutional 
stimulated form 
constitutional 
coercive form 
Table 2: Sample of negotiating institutions 
 
Basing on these considerations we assume that there is a variety of characteristics that 
moderate the degree of mediatization effects for negotiating systems. Our assumptions 
relate to the following criteria, which are listed in table 3. 
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dimensions influencing factors 
 
Level of Formalization  
 
institutional structure 
Level of public openness, transparency 
 
Orientations of bargaining (Mayntz 1993) 
• compromises concerning different interests// 
balancing of interests 
• problem solving 
• problems of distribution (of public 
goods/resources) 
Necessity of public acceptance (legitimacy) 
decisional process 
 
Binding character 
Exit-option (alternative options of problem 
solving) actors 
involved actors 
Homogeneity of actors and number of actors 
Modus operandi Frequency of meetings 
Table 3: Characteristics, structures and procedures of negotiating institutions 
In order not to go beyond the scope of this paper, we will confine our further argumentation 
to the dimensions "institutional structure" and "involved actors". We draw four assumptions 
regarding the likeliness of mediatization effects in negotiating systems. The independent 
variable mediatization effects is operationalized as the implementation of aspects of media 
logic as summarized in table 1 in the political behaviour of institutional actors. 
1. Informal networks, e.g. politically demanded form of cooperation, are more vulnerable than 
formal negotiating institutions, especially as forms of constitutional coercive negotiation.  
2. The more negotiating institutions are open for the public the more likely are mediatization 
effects. 
3. If there are exit options for actors, what means that there are alternative options for 
problem-solving than negotiating, the likeliness for mediatization effects is higher than 
without exit options. 
4. The more homogeneous the actors are and the smaller their number is, the less likely are 
mediatization effects.  
 
Case studies 
The following case studies are considered as examples for the possibilities as well as the 
limitations of mediatization effects in negotiating institutions. Mediatization effects depend 
deeply on the structures, processes, and characteristics of the object of mediatization effects. 
The chosen case studies reveal different types of institutions with a different national and 
therefore historic and cultural background. After describing the characteristics of each 
institution, we will discuss their potential of implementing media logics based along the 
criteria in table 2 and examine the above formulated assumptions. 
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Conclave 
It is appropriate to look at the Conclave as the negotiating institution with the mandate of 
electing popes not only because of latest incidences. The Conclave is especially suited as 
object of investigation because of its nearly unchanged procedures and structures for 
hundreds of years. In addition, the Conclave is an interesting object of investigation because 
of the public attention and therefore media attention it always gains when it convenes. If 
mediatization is really a fundamental social process, which alters pre-modern institutions, we 
should be able to discover indices for it even in the case of the Conclave. We consider the 
Conclave in this context as a quasi-democratic negotiating institution because of its election 
procedure, and therefore as a "forerunner model" of modern negotiating institutions. 
Since late 13th century in case of the Conclave (from the Latin com clave, “with keys”; cp. 
Colomer & McLean, 1998: 12) the public is seen as an influence which endangers electoral 
freedom. So the most striking characteristic of the Conclave is certainly its complete walling-
off from public, what is reflected also in the locking and the technical investigation of the 
rooms, in which the cardinals convene. At the beginning of the Conclave the elective 
cardinals have to swear an oath to absolute secrecy about the election of the new pope (cp. 
Universi Dominici Gregis, cap. II, 48). After lengthy discussion the cardinals elect secretly a 
new pope according to the qualified-majority-rule. Against this background it is all the more 
surprising that a few months after Benedict’s XVI election in 2005 an anonymous cardinal 
tells media in detail about the several ballots in the Conclave. Is this indiscretion an indication 
for mediatization of even a Vatican institution? 
According to the postulated criteria and influencing factors above, we argue that this 
indiscretion is indeed a reflex on immense media attention for the new pope, though it does 
not suit as an indicator for mediatization. It is profoundly unlike, that this enormous media 
attention will lead to an institutional change of the Conclave – neither in its procedures nor in 
its information policy. The Conclave seen as a negotiating institution must be regarded as an 
institution with the highest grade of formalization. The self-conception of the Conclave is 
founded on the belief, that the standing orders are based on God’s will, which is enunciated 
through His “deputies” on earth. Adjustments on modern mass media are restricted to 
adjustments in technical regards, e.g. the searching of the Conclave’s rooms towards 
microphones or similar. It is assumed, that the latest incidents, regarding the Conclave as 
well as the pope’s election in general, are no new phenomena of an increased mass media 
power. They are the modern form of expression of a general interest in the institution “pope” 
itself, which can be found decades before. Furthermore, going public is no real option for the 
supporters of potential candidates. It is more than unlikely that the bigger part of the elective 
candidates, who comes from all over the world, would be influenced by the coverage of a 
regional newspaper or a national TV program.  
In sum, the example Conclave shows that media attention is a necessary but no sufficient 
condition for the probability of an institution’s mediatization. If the institution possesses strong 
factors of persistence, such as its level of formalization or its long history, implementations of 
media logic are less likely. Besides, in this context, another interesting question is, whether 
the telegenic potential of the different candidates influences the substance of negotiations. 
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Federal Council of Switzerland 
For the Swiss government, the Swiss Federal Council, it is widely discussed, if an ending of 
the specific Swiss principle of collegiality is probable. The Swiss Federal Council has seven 
members, which are elected from parliament without special assignments. Afterwards every 
member takes one of seven departments. In principle, the members of the federal council are 
coequal; they handle their duties and responsibilities conjointly and absolutely autonomous 
from their respective party. This system knows no head of government, what is often justified 
that this fact “mirrors the cultural founded aversion to dominating positions of power of 
individuals” (Linder, 1999: 223). But, politicians as well as journalists have discussed this 
principle’s change for decades, both as an already existing fact as well as a probable 
possibility. Another characteristic of Swiss government is its party political formation, which is 
defined by the so called "Zauberformel" (magic formula) since 1959. The magic formula 
determines which party sends how many members in the federal council. In 2003 the 
longstanding structure was modified in favor of the right-wing catch-all party, “SVP”, which 
obtained a second seat. Since then, inside this board a trend of party-political polarization 
has been strengthened, which has emerged for the past ten years. 
The increasing polarization inside the federal council attacks the principle of collegiality, what 
is discussed both in every political party and in media coverage. Core argument in this 
discussion is the increasing number of indiscretions from the direction of the federal council. 
In principle, the council’s meetings are non-public. Members do not talk about internal 
bargaining processes; the board presents its decisions to public as collective. Everything 
what is known about negotiation processes inside the council results from such indiscretions 
(cp. Linder, 1999: 224). The possibility to use media public as an instrument for pressure in 
formally discrete negotiations increases the probability that single actors act party-orientated 
instead of polity-orientated. Thus, the function of negotiation institutions is limited in the 
extent as going (media) public becomes a legitimate strategic option for involved actors, 
because they use the public sphere as an alternative venue for problem-solving. This 
becomes a probable pattern and acceptable exit-option for political actors, if absolute 
transparency is demanded by public – as it is the case in the Swiss media arena. The 
established patterns of media coverage produce a media image of the federal council, which 
is conflict-orientated and de-politicising (focuses on conflicts between members and not on 
political matters). 
These developments must be seen as novelty in Swiss politics, because indiscretions come 
lately ascribable from single council members, who place them in media interviews or public 
speeches.6 So, actual incidents become indications for a development, which is also seen in 
other political systems: The communicative reduction of complex structures and processes to 
one single member of a cooperative institution, who is framed by media as a go-getter and 
                                                 
6 A quantitative content analysis by the authors of this paper of 129 articles, which focus on the principle of 
collegiality and were published during the time period from January, 1st, 1997 to June, 6th, 2005 in the Swiss 
national newspapers „Tages-Anzeiger“, „Neue Zürcher Zeitung“, „Sonntagszeitung“ and „NZZ am Sonntag“ (from 
June 2002 on), confirmed the increase of media coverage in general as well as the increase of articles that 
referred to actions of members from the council that are adverse to the principle of collegiality from September, 
2003 on (in December 2003 Blocher was elected to the Swiss Federal Council). 
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who features as problem-solver and common sense-person. This person – actually Christoph 
Blocher, a SVP member of the Swiss Federal Council, - has to fail necessarily on these high 
expectations, because this way of presentation objects fundamentally the principle of 
consent and collegiality in the Federal Council, which is founded on the principle of equality 
of all members. This is an example for deliberative democracy which gets under pressure of 
media democracy, what could lead to a limited function of negotiating institutions. 
But, what means this for the Federal Council’s likeliness of getting mediatized? We assume 
that this probability is relatively low - besides mediatization through personalization effects as 
presented above. But as long as going public is a rare exit option of the council’s members, 
increasing influence of mass media cannot be expected. Though media attention for the 
Swiss Federal Council is definitely high because of the binding character of its decisions, 
media impact in the dimension of polity is constricted. This assumption bases above all on 
the level of formalization. Every change or reform of its procedures, membership, or mission 
needs a high deliberative and bureaucratic effort, and it needs a direct democratic order from 
the Swiss people. For this reason, the general potential for changes of the Federal Council is 
limited to ways of incremental shifts. 
 
Conference Committee 
Conference committees are negotiating institutions: Conferees from both Congress 
chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives, try to resolve differences between 
the two chambers and report identical measures. Since a bill cannot become law until it has 
been approved in identical form by both Houses of Congress, the committee is often 
described as “the stage of the legislative process where the nation's laws are often really 
written" (Allen, & Cochran, 2003: 2761). Manley (1970: 271) describes the action of 
conference committees as following: „The overriding ethic of the Conference Committee is 
one of bargaining, give-and-take, compromise, horse-trading, conciliation, and malleability by 
all concerned […] compromise is the candid rule of conference committees. Small wonder 
that each side claims victory, because almost everyone does win - something, somehow, 
sometime.” Nevertheless, studies on conference decision making focus on the question: 
“Who wins in conference, the House or the Senate?” (cp. Ferejohn, 1975: 1033; Gross, 
1980). Those studies focus on the results of the negotiations. For our research question 
regarding the possibilities of mediatization, the conference decision-making is more relevant. 
Therefore, we will look on the characteristics, structures and procedures of the Conference 
Committee. Unfortunately, few research concentrates on the conference decision-making. 
This is also the case, because no official records are kept that can shed light on who was 
included in the committee or how the deliberation processed7. Conference action is neither 
transparent nor open to public. The level of formalization is rather marginal, since there are 
some rules concerning member formation, the authority of the committee, and conference 
reports. But the action itself, the deliberative process is unregulated. “Negotiating sessions 
                                                 
7 The rules of the House require that one conference meeting be open, unless the House determines by a vote of 
the yeas and nays that a meeting will be close to public. 
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range from relatively open to non-existing.” (Allen, & Cochran, 2003: 2762). For example, in 
the year 1992 conferences on the nation's energy law were held in the Cannon Caucas room 
in the House of Representatives Office Building. In the year 2003, talks on the energy bill 
were held in a Capitol hideaway, out of earshot of Democrats or dissenting Republicans 
(Allen, & Cochran, 2003: 2762). Member formation is regulated in so far, as conferences 
from both Houses are in the committee. The Senate and the House committees don't need to 
have the same size but each House has one vote and acts by a majority vote. For this 
reasons, the number of managers from each House is largely immaterial. Member formation 
is quite homogeneous and usually a rather small number of actors meet: “The reason for 
conference committees to be small with just a few members is so that we can work it out and 
get it done in an expedited manner”, House Majority Leader Tom Delay said (Allen, & 
Cochran, 2003: 2761). “So those meetings are being held with members who want to get a 
bill on the floor and to the president.” The need for approval of decisions is relatively high, 
since both Houses of Congress must approve the bill in identical form. In case they both 
approve the bill, the decision is obliging. In case there is no agreement, there is an exit 
option. New conferees may be appointed in either or both Houses. 
Altogether the characteristics of conference committees speak for low chances regarding the 
level of possible mediatization processes in the conference committee. This is particularly the 
case since the Republicans took control of the House in 1995, which seems to have let to 
both less transparency and public openness as well as an important role of partisanship.  
 
Exploratory talks following the elections for the German Bundestag 
After the elections for the German Bundestag in September 2005 the Red-Green-Coalition, 
the coalition of the two German political parties SPD (the Social Democratic Party) and 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ("the Greens"), lost their majority in parliament. The conservative 
alliance of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) together with 
the Liberal Party (FDP) did not get the majority either, in contrast to the prognoses of public 
opinion polls. Both of the two political groups Red-Green and Black (conservative alliance) – 
Yellow (Liberal Party) did not have an own majority. Despite the missing majority of Red-
Green, the chancellor Gerhard Schröder felt himself confirmed in his post and he took the 
election results as indication that citizens again want a government under his leadership. In 
contrast, Angela Merkel, chancellor candidate of the conservative alliance, claimed the 
leadership for herself. Eventually, one month after the elections, on October, 17, coalition 
negotiation talks for a big coalition with Angela Merkel as chancellor started. What interests 
us here, is the negotiation process that took place between September, 18 and October, 17. 
Politicians of both parliamentary parties, Social Democrats and conservative alliance, met in 
exploratory talks: on September, 22, September, 28, and October, 5. Members were several 
leading politicians from both parliamentary parties, so there was a huge homogeneity among 
the actors. 
We can find certain mediatization effects on the exploratory talks which result from the 
likeliness of the talks for implementing media logic. Latter was used strategically to achieve 
certain objectives. The relatively low degree of formalization in that case gave actors the 
freedom to do so. So the appearance as well as the degree of mediatization effects is 
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influenced by the incentives connected to the implementation of media logic into negotiating 
processes. During the talks, politicians spoke out in public on alternative forms of coalitions 
or speculations on the ministers of a new government. Politicians of the conservative alliance 
repeatedly brought the option of a coalition with other parties in to public discussion, in order 
to put pressure on the Social Democrats. Furthermore, external criticism played a big role. 
For example there were rumors, that the Social Democrats consider modifications of the by-
laws of the German Bundestag: National parties instead of parliamentary parties should be 
the basis for the declaration of the strongest power in parliament. Strongest party was the 
Social Democrats Party, not the Christian Democratic Party. This rumor was widely 
discussed in media and actors of the conservative alliance expressed their opinions 
disgustedly. The Social Democrats probably wanted to intimidate the conservative alliance, 
and for that reason the discussion was public. But for public discussion taking another course 
and conservative politicians venting their anger in media, a front politician of the Social 
Democrats said in public that the party did not have any modifications of the by-laws in their 
agenda. 
But not only external, also internal criticism was discussed in public. The official speaker on 
financial topics from the Christian Democrats, who is considered as one of the strongest 
party-intern opponents of Angela Merkel, was the first front politician of the conservative 
alliance who said that the alliance did not win the elections. In case of the Social Democratic 
Party, the governing mayor of Berlin spoke about the possibility of a big coalition without 
Schröder being chancellor during the time before the initial exploratory talks. His party was 
disgruntled. 
We can conclude that the exploratory talks were dominated by elements of media logic, in 
contrast to the logic of negotiating institutions. Going (media) public also was a strategic 
option both for involved and non-involved actors, who wanted an alternative coalition. Thus 
decisions were made subsequently in talks between very limited numbers of front politicians 
from both parties. In a circlet, five front politicians met in informal talks to negotiate about the 
chancellor question, close from public. Here we find clear elements of the logic of negotiating 
institutions, in contrast to media logics. We find requirements for effective solutions in the 
modus of negotiations: a small number of actors, very homogeneous actors, no public, no 
leaks. On October, 10th, party committees of both the conservative alliance and the Social 
Democrats approve the decision to enter into negotiations for a big coalition, with Angela 
Merkel as chancellor. 
 
Conclusions from the case studies 
Media attention appeared to be an essential, but by far not the sufficient condition for media 
effects in negotiating institutions. Media attention per se does not need to result in an 
implementation of media logic of institutions. We found that especially those institutions that 
apparently are most resistant to mediatization effects are characterized by strong media 
interest and intense media coverage (cp. table 2). Conclave and conference committee are 
characterized by negotiating processes that are dominated by the logic of negotiations, 
despite rather strong media attention. On the other hand, the exploratory talks are 
characterized by intense media coverage, and at the same time we find the dominance of 
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media logic in contrast. The Federal Council of Switzerland is sort of between those two 
types: strong media interest goes align with some implementations of media logic. 
The appearance as well as the degree of mediatization effects is influenced by certain 
characteristics, structures, and procedures of negotiating institutions. Mediating factors are 
the incentives connected to the implementation of media logic into negotiating processes. So 
what characteristics foster media effects, and what characteristics in contrast impede the 
implementation of media logic? We now want to formulate conclusions that are based on the 
case studies that are discussed previously. But what we have to bear in mind is that this 
cannot be in form of causations or general connections, since cultural as well as political and 
social frameworks are to be considered also. We found confirmation for our assumption, that 
informal networks are more likely to implement media logics than constitutional coercive 
negotiation. But, the incentives connected to the implementation of media logic into 
negotiating processes act as mediating factors in that case. So we found a low level of 
formalization especially for the exploratory talks. That gave political actors the freedom to 
react strategically and to implement media logics in order to get advantages in the 
negotiating process. On the other hand, we found a rather low level of formalization for the 
conference committee as well, but in that case there was no dominance of media logic. That 
is the case, since political actors would not have any benefits from that, in contrast: The 
closer to public those negotiations are, the more likely it is that conferees get to their 
decisions. In case of a high level of formalization the likeliness of media effects is rather low.. 
That is the case for both Conclave and the Federal Council of Switzerland. 
We also found evidence for the assumption, that if there are exit options for actors, the 
likeliness for mediatization effects is higher than without exit options. Exit options indeed 
foster the implementation of media logic, as described for both the exploratory talks as well 
as the Federal Council of Switzerland. Furthermore, we found evidence for the assumption 
that a relatively high level of public openness and transparency enhances mediatization 
effects (exploratory talks), whereas a relatively low level of transparency and public 
openness impede such processes (Conclave). Since we found a rather high homogeneity 
and a rather small number of actors in all of our case studies, we can not examine the 
assumptions we made in this respect. Table 4 gives an overview of the connections we 
found between characteristics of negotiating institutions and the likeliness of mediatization 
effects. Variables that we found to moderate mediatization effects are shaded grey.. 
 
dimensions influencing 
factors 
Conclave 
Federal 
 
Council of 
Switzerland 
 
Conference 
Committee 
 
Exploratory 
talks 
 
Level of 
Formalization 
++ 
 
++ o -- institution 
Level of public 
openness, 
transparency 
 
-- 
 
- -- ++ 
actors Exit-option 
(alternative 
options of 
problem 
-- + o ++ 
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solving) 
 
Homogeneity 
of actors and 
number of 
actors 
 
++ ++ ++ + 
Table 4: Factors influencing the likeliness of mediatization effects of negotiating institutions 
 
Discussion 
Most research on mediatization bases on a quantitative perspective on mediatization (cp. 
Jarren, 2001). The basic assumption is that the expansion of media sector and the more of 
media products lead to more media coverage and results in a bigger media impact on social 
actors. In opposition to this causation, we assume, that media attention and media coverage 
are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for mediatization. As we have shown in the 
chosen case studies above, high levels of media attention can be found also for institutions 
which hold strong powers of persistence against mediatization effects. Both Conclave and 
Swiss Federal Council have developed a couple of procedures to lock up from public. 
Therefore, we state, that it is unlikely that they become mediatized in the near future. Thus, 
the likeliness of mediatization effects on Conclave and Swiss Federal Council is 
comparatively low – in spite of an intense media attention. 
Existing research has tended to focus on the impacts of mediatization, rather than on the 
fundamental institutional preconditions of mediatization at all. So, an oftentimes ploughed 
field of research faces a less observed topic. This means a desideratum for further research. 
If the concept of mediatization in future should persist as a central interest of research, mass 
communication sciences are bound to pay more regard to the preconditions of mediatization.  
On the basis of the presented model of influencing factors it is possible to differentiate the 
global theorem of mediatization, which means a contribution for further research. Moreover, it 
is possible to derive specific hypotheses implying the concrete institutional, political, and 
cultural context of the institution, which is in the focus of researchers' interest. That means 
the reduction of complexity through categories that can be operationalized. On this basis, the 
global and highly discussable statement that western democracies in all get mediatized, 
could be differentiated and analyzed. 
Moreover, the findings presented in this paper hold implications for the discussion of 
challenges to political institutions in modern democracies. The results indicate that not all 
democratic institutions are equally subject to mediatization effects. Rather, mediatization 
effects are moderated by the complex interaction between media logic and the specific logic 
of political institutions. Hence, the contradiction that West European democracies are 
confronted with - which arises from the combination of negotiated and media democracy - 
can be answered by drawing on factors that might prevent political institutions from getting 
“mediatized”. In other words, not all negotiating institutions are per se challenged by the role 
media plays in modern democracies. There are institutional characteristics that impede 
mediatization effects. Such institutional characteristics are a high level of formalization, a low 
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level of public openness and no exit-options for the political actors involved in the negotiation 
processes.  
Besides possibilities for negotiating institutions to impede media effects, we argue that 
mediatization effects are not necessarily dysfunctional. In some situations the 
implementation of media logic might in fact be functional from the perspective of the political 
actors. That is the case for instance in situations where public statements advance the actors 
bargaining position or worsen the position of the political opponent. 
In general, the findings presented here suggest that mediatization is not a challenge of 
democratic institutions per se, but fundamentally depends on moderating effects of 
institutional characteristics. Further research hence has to analyze negotiating processes 
and media influence in greater detail than we were able to do it in the presented case 
studies. The cases presented here are used to illustrate our main argument, that institutional 
characteristics moderate mediatization effects. We will more precisely analyze the role of 
media for negotiating institutions in the project “The dynamics of political institutions in 
mediated democracies: Political bargaining and the transformation of the public sphere.” In 
the project we will also pay more attention to the role of context variables as political culture 
than we were able to do this here. There is more research to do, but the findings presented 
here indicate that institutional characteristics matter and detailed investigations appear to be 
very fruitful in order to specify the general assumption of mediatization effects in modern 
democracies. 
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